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Recently, Latin America has entered another phase of the repeated cycles of boom
and bust in foreign capital inflows. After the rapid build-up of non-performing debt
until the early 1980s and the subsequent period of serious capital shortage, foreign
capital is now returning to Latin America in huge proportions. Net capital inflows
soared from less than US$ 10 billion in 1989 to US$ 20 billion in 1990, US$ 39 billion
in 1991, and an estimated US$ 57 billion in 1992 [ECLAC, 1992, Table 17].
This drastic change appears to suggest that economic advice is no longer needed as
to how debt-ridden economies in Latin America may regain access to the
international capital market. Actually, the debate in political and scientific circles has
shifted to the issue of how to prevent another episode of excessive capital inflows
[see e.g. Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart 1992; 1993; Reisen 1993a]. The discussion on
the pros and cons of various types of policy intervention such as taxes on capital
imports, higher reserve requirements on bank deposits, as well as sterilized and non-
sterilized central bank intervention is based on the (explicit or implicit) assumption
that huge capital inflows to Latin America will prove to be another short-lived
phenomenon. The perceived "hot money" character of inflows gives rise to several
concerns, which policy intervention is supposed to tackle [Calvo, Leiderman,
Reinhart, 1993, pp. 25f.]:
- Capital inflows may adversely affect the international competitiveness of exports if
they result in an undesired real exchange rate appreciation.
- A misallocation of resources may result from massive inflows if domestic financial
intermediation is deficient.
- A sudden reversal of speculative inflows threatens to trigger a domestic financial
crisis.
Much of the current debate suggests that the recent capital inflows and the ensuing
economic policy issues are rather bad news for Latin America. The present paper
challenges this view from different angles. First, recent trends of capital inflows to
Latin America are contrasted with evidence from other regions (Section II). A
country-specific assessment of the significance and structure of capital inflows casts
doubts on the generalized "hot money" interpretation. Second, the differences
among Latin American economies are related to economic policy and performance
indicators (Section III). This analysis challenges the widespread perception of a
dominant role of external factors in explaining the boom of capital inflows to Latin
America. It is argued that the critical question of whether capital inflows can besustained depends primarily on the policy stance of Latin American governments.
Earlier conclusions on how to ensure continued access to international capital
markets are shown to remain highly relevant even under the present conditions of
booming inflows. Third, some policy options are discussed to deal with unsustainable
capital inflows (Section IV). The economic rationale for policy interventions is
questioned. While intervention is counterproductive where capital imports can be
considered sustainable, its effectiveness is shown to be seriously flawed when
inflows are of a "hot money" character. Countries for which significant "hot money"
inflows are revealed are rather required to intensify domestic reform efforts in order
to reduce the risk of a sudden reversal of speculative transactions.
II. From Outflows to Unsustainable Inflows?
1. Why Large Inflows Must be Put into Perspective
The sheer magnitude of recent capital inflows to Latin America and the sharp
contrast to the earlier shortage of foreign resources are typically taken as telling
indications of a short-lived boom episode. Several reasons indeed suggest a
temporary phenomenon of particularly high transfers in the early 1990s.
1 Inflows
related to privatization schemes are likely to decline with a decreasing number of
remaining state enterprises. Similarly, the repatriation of flight capital might have
significantly reduced the funds still staying abroad. Economic recovery and rising
interest rates in the United States would weaken the incentive of US investors to
channel more capital to high-interest locations in Latin America. Moreover, short-
term portfolio investment might easily flow out of the region once the economic
climate in the United States and other industrialized countries improves.
It would be strongly misleading, however, to consider the inflows to be excessive and
induced by speculation simply because the absolute numbers are large. First, capital
inflows are not outstandingly high relative to Latin America's GNP. The inflow to GNP
ratio increased from 2 to 4.8 per cent in the period 1990-1992 [ECLAC, 1992, Table
17; World Bank, b]. The 1992 figure largely resembles the ratios reported for the
second half of the 1970s (5.1 per cent) and the early 1980s (1980-1981: 4.9 per
cent). It does not make much sense to contrast the recent figures with the period of
seriously depressed capital inflows to Latin America.
2
1 Reisen [1993a] provides a concise summary of the main arguments.
2 In 1982-1989, the average inflow to GNP ratio was down to 1.4 per cent.Second, a comparison between 10 Latin American countries and 8 Southeast Asian
countries reveals that the rise in capital inflows in the early 1990s is not restricted to
the former region. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart [1993, Table 4] have calculated a
similarly large increase of the capital account to GDP ratio for Latin America (2.5
percentage points) and Southeast Asia (2.3 percentage points), when confronting
1990-1991 with 1984-1989. Moreover, the average ratio for the Asian economies is
considerably higher (3.5 vis-a-vis 0.4 per cent in 1990-1991). Against this
background, one may wonder why there is so much concern about "speculative"
inflows to Latin America while such fears are hardly voiced with regard to Asia.
Third, and most importantly, the aggregate picture for Latin America obscures
pronounced country-specific differences. Comparing 1984-1989 and 1990-1991, the
change in the capital account to GDP ratio of the most important debtor countries
varies from -0.3 percentage points for Venezuela, and 1.2-1.6 percentage points for
Brazil and Argentina, to 5.8 percentage points for Chile and Mexico [ibid]. This
variation provides a first indication that capital inflows are concentrated on countries
which have established a strong reputation of reform-mindedness.
3 Table 1 presents
further evidence in this respect. The capital inflow to GNP ratio increases for nearly
all sample countries. But both the initial level of this ratio and its increase differ
considerably. Taking averages for 1990-1992, the ratio is highest for Bolivia (10.2
per cent) and Chile (8.4 per cent). Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia and Venezuela range
at the bottom with ratios for 1.3 to -2 per cent.
Table 1 - Total Net Capital Inflows to Selected Latin American Countries, 1990-1992














































a Preliminary estimates. GNP figures for 1992 were estimated by applying preliminary GDP
growth rates to GNP figures for 1991
Source: ECLAC [1992], World Bank [b, 1992].
3 For a detailed assessment of the link between economic reforms and capital inflows, see Section2. Why "Hot Money" is Difficult to Identify
As concerns the sustainability of capital inflows to Latin America, the structure of
transfers reveals important insights. The risk of a sudden reversal varies
considerably among the different types of inflows. Evidently, this risk is lowest in the
case of foreign direct investment (FDI) [see also Reisen, 1993a, p. 3]. It remains
fairly low for grants and longer-term loans from official sources. With regard to
private creditors, the maturity structure of capital inflows is crucially important. The
widespread concern about the "hot money" character of inflows implicitly assumes
that short-term transfers from private sources constitute the bulk of recent capital
imports.
Hard facts justifying such an assumption are largely lacking. This is not surprising
given that the available data are seriously deficient. The most detailed breakdown of
capital flows into major components is provided by the World Bank [bj. However, this
source presents an incomplete picture on total capital flows. The coverage of short-
term, speculative flows is particularly poor. In the case of Latin America, statistical
deficiencies can be illustrated by contrasting World Bank data with the more
comprehensive information on total flows provided by ECLAC (Table 2). The
widening discrepancy in the early 1990s may suggest that a rising proportion of "hot
money" transactions escape the World Bank statistics.
Table 2 - The Discrepancy in Net Capital Inflows to Latin America



















a Long-term (net) resource flows, f














deluding IMF loans. In parentheses:
debt and (net) IMF loans. -
 D
Source: ECLAC [1992), World Bank [b, 1992).Again, however, a country-specific evaluation is very enlightening, although such a
disaggregation is possible for the period 1990-1991 only. Table 3 reveals that the
discrepancy between the data sets is most pronounced for Peru and Brazil, where
comprehensive and consistent economic reforms were not implemented throughout
the 1980s.
4 In these countries, recent capital inflows may indeed consist of "hot
money" in the first place. In sharp contrast, long-term resource flows account for 72
per cent of total inflows (reported by ECLAC) in the case of Chile, i.e. the economy
Table 3 - The Discrepancy in Net Capital Inflows to Selected Latin American Countries between
















































a Accumulated figures. - *> Long-term (net) resource flow,










































., excluding IMF loans. In parentheses: including net
Source: ECLAC (1992]: World Bank [b, 1992].
4 Colombia and Venezuela are not considered here. Negative figures according to the broader
ECLAC delinition suggest that speculative capital outflows rather than inflows remain unrecorded
by the World Bank. Although the discrepancy is less pronounced than for Colombia and
Venezuela, World Bank figures exceed the ECLAC figures for Bolivia and Uruguay as well. In the
Bolivian case, 70 per cent of long-term resource flows consist of grants.with the longest reform tradition.
5 Countries where domestic policy adjustments were
postponed (e.g. Mexico) or seriously delayed (e.g. Argentina) range between these
two extremes.
3. Why the Composition of Inflows Matters
The subsequent information on the structure of capital inflows, as defined by the
World Bank, underscores that a country-specific perspective is required for any
meaningful assessment of the sustainability issue. Typically, aggregate figures for
the whole region disguise remarkable differences at the country level. The data also
support the earlier argument that, in many respects, the revival of capital inflows to
Latin America is rather modest when contrasted with the evidence tor other regions.
The following sections focus on the composition of long-term inflows, especially the
contribution of FDI, and on their maturity structure.
Table A1 in the statistical appendix reveals that Latin America has not yet restored
its attractiveness for foreign capital relative to other capital-importing regions. Its
share in total (long-term) flows to all reporting countries dwindled from 35 per cent in
1980 to 11 per cent in 1989. Notwithstanding the subsequent recovery, Latin
America's share remained below 20 per cent. The inflow to GNP ratio for this region,
which had exceeded the overall average in 1980 (4.25 versus 3.97 per cent), was
little more than half the average figure in 1992. Measured by this ratio, Latin America
was not only outperformed by regions which largely depend on foreign aid transfers
(particularly Sub-Sahara Africa; see Table A2). More importantly, a relative decline of
attractiveness is to be observed vis-a-vis East Asia, for which the steady increase of
resource inflows was interrupted only shortly in the mid-1980s.
The differences between Latin America and East Asia are most pronounced with
regard to private non-guaranteed debt. Among the regions given in Table A1, only
East Asia succeeded to maintain positive, though temporarily declining, inflows of
this type throughout the period considered. In sharp contrast, Latin America suffered
most severely from outflows of private non-guaranteed debt, and the figures for the
early 1990s suggest that creditworthiness has not yet been regained. Latin
America's position with respect to FDI is better, though impaired in relative terms.
After FDI inflows had more or less stagnated during the 1980s, they soared in 1991-
1992. The recent increase, supporting the sustainability of capital inflows, did not
5 According to World Bank data [b, 1992], Chile significantly reduced its short-term debt in 1991.
Long-term resource (lows considerably exceeded total flows under this definition (Table 3),
supporting the argument that the bulk of capital inflows to Chile is likely to be sustainable.prevent, however, that the region lost in attractiveness as compared to East Asia.
The East Asian share in FDI flows to all reporting countries nearly trebled from 14
per cent in 1980 to 39 per cent in 1992, whereas the share of Latin America was
down from 66 to 36 per cent.
6
As compared to 1982, the (long-term) inflow to GNP ratio was still significantly lower
for most Latin American countries in the beginning of the 1990s (Table 4).
7
Nevertheless, considerable differences are evident within the sample. The
discrepancy between the ratio in 1982 and its average in 1990-1991 is exceptionally
large for Argentina (10.8 percentage points), and considerably above the Latin
American average for Peru (5.5 percentage points), Brazil (4 percentage points) and
Colombia (3.6 percentage points). Apart from Uruguay, where absolute figures are
marginal, the discrepancy is smallest for Chile (2.4 percentage points). A comparison
between Brazil and Mexico provides further evidence tentatively supporting the
hypothesized impact of economic reforms on restoring the attractiveness for foreign
capital. In both countries, the inflow to GNP ratio dwindled to less than 1 per cent
during the first half of the 1980s. Thereafter the trend was completely different. The
ratio remained low and, temporarily, became even negative in the case of Brazil,
whereas Mexico experienced a significant recovery once the adjustment programme
gathered momentum (see also Section III).
Similar differences prevail among Latin American economies as concerns major
components of capital inflows (Table 4). In 1988-1991, accumulated net outflows of
private non-guaranteed debt were highest for Brazil and Mexico. However, the latter
country regained creditworthiness in the early 1990s. Again, Chile ranks at the top of
Notwithstanding this unfavourable development for Latin America, the effect on the sustainability of
capital inflows (excluding short-term flows) is not straightforward. Depressed debt inflows after the
outbreak of the debt crisis and the recent increase of FDI resulted in high and increasing shares of
FDI in total (long-term) capital inflows to Latin America (Table A2). Throughout the period 1985-
1992, the FDI share exceeded the respective share for East Asia. Correspondingly, the
contribution of private creditors to total inflows became negative in the case of Latin America
whereas it was close to one third (average of the annual figures in Table A2) in the case of East
Asia. As argued above, the risk of a reversal of capital flows among the categories included in
Table A2 is highest for debt from private sources. Hence, it may be concluded that there is no
reason for concern with respect to the sustainability of long-term capital inflows to Latin America.
The current debate on sustainability appears to be biased given that no such concerns are
expressed for East Asia, although the above figures suggest a higher risk of reversal.
The exception of Bolivia is due to the grants extended by foreign governments to support the
country's economic stabilization programme (see also Table A3). Ecuador reported (marginal) net
outflows in 1982; the inflows of 1991-1992 are small as compared to the second half of the 1980s.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: World Bank [b, 1992].the sample in terms of private non-guaranteed debt inflows since the late 1980s.
Neglecting the sample countries for which absolute FDI flows were extremely small,
Brazil represents the only economy for which FDI flows were still seriously
depressed in 1991 as compared to 1982.
8 By contrast, neighbouring countries
attracted increasing amounts of FDI. The growth of FDI was most impressive in
Argentina and Mexico.
9 Together with Chile, Costa Rica and Venezuela, these
countries received significant FDI inflows in terms of GNP in 1991, which helps the
sustainability of capital imports (Table 4).
1
0
4. Why the Maturity of Debt is Important
As shown above, World Bank statistics are deficient as concerns short-term capital
inflows. Nevertheless, they provide some important information which has been
largely neglected in the debate on sustainability. Such information relates to the
maturity of new credit commitments and to the significance of short-term debt flows.
The widespread concern about the sustainability of capital flows to Latin America
suggests that maturities have been shortened and short-term debt has gained in
importance. The empirical support for these propositions is weak at best.
A comparison between Latin America and other regions reveals the following (Table
5):
- The average maturity of new commitments by all creditors is somewhat lower in
Latin America than in most other regions. This is due to the traditionally larger role
8 This may be interpreted as another indication that the sustainability of capital inflows is at risk for
Brazil in the first place. However, a qualification is required since the decline of debt flows was
more severe than the decrease of FDI flows (see also note 6). Because of outflows of long-term
debt, the FDI share in total long-term inflows to Brazil exceeded 100 per cent in 1991, as was the
case for Argentina and Colombia (Table A3). The seriously eroded creditworthiness improved the
sustainability of the remaining long-term capital inflows, but at the cost of a continued shortage of
foreign resources.
9 High FDI inflows to Venezuela were restricted to 1991.
1
0 The interpretation of Table A3 may reasonably be restricted to countries with positive accumulated
debt flows in the period 1989-1991, i.e. less impaired or improved creditworthiness. The following
classification is then possible with regard to the changes in the structure of long-term capital
inflows (1991 vis-a-vis 1985): First, the sustainability definitely improved in Ecuador (higher shares
of FDI and grants), Chile (higher FDI share) and Costa Rica (higher FDI share, while the relative
decline of grants was compensated by credits from official sources). Second, the FDI share
remained very high for Mexico, although it compares unfavourably with periods of small total
inflows. Third, Bolivia does not face serious problems of sustainability due to its continued strong
reliance on grants. Fourth, the evidence is inconclusive or incomplete for Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela.Table 5 - The Malurily ol Debl in Developing Countries
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Source: World Bank [b, 1992).11
of loans from private sources which typically carry relatively short maturities. In
contrast to the above proposition, however, the average maturity did not decline
but rather increased. A clear decline is neither to be observed with regard to the
maturities offered by private creditors; the average maturity in 1990-1991 was
nearly the same as in 1985.
- The share of short-term debt stocks in total debt stocks of Latin America
increased by 4-5 percentage points. Notwithstanding this unfavourable
development, the share remained considerably below that one of East Asia.
- The annual share of short-term debt flows in total debt flows fluctuated heavily,
especially so in Latin America." Taking averages for 1990-1992, Latin America
(45 per cent) ranged between East Asia (38 per cent) and North Africa and the
Middle East (60 per cent). In terms of GNP, the significance of short-term debt
inflows was considerably smaller than in East Asia in the early 1990s.
Furthermore, the projected 1992 ratio of 0.4 per cent for Latin America compares
favourably with 1988-1989.
The evidence for individual countries is more difficult to interpret (Table A4). Clear
trends can rarely be identified because small overall debt flows result in strong
annual variations of the indicators considered. The average maturity of new
commitments from all sources varies according to the creditor structure of debt. It is
noteworthy, however, that the maturity declined in Brazil although the initial level of
12 years was already among the lowest in 1985. By contrast, the remaining seven
economies with maturities below 14 years in 1985 reported longer maturities of total
new commitments in 1990-1991.
1
2
In the early 1990s, the stock of short-term debt reached about 20 per cent of total
debt stocks in Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay (Table A4). Again, the
sustainability of capital inflows appears to be at risk in Brazil and Peru in the first
place, which experienced the steepest rise of short-term relative to total debt stocks.
1
1 For the extreme volatility of this indicator with respect to individual Latin American economies, see
Table A4.
1
2 The changes in maturities of commitments by private creditors are rather puzzling. In some cases
(e.g. Costa Rica, Peru), the observed volatility is probably due to the limited number of underlying
loans. Fairly stable or increasing maturities (1990-1991 vis-a-vis 1985) are consistent with the
evidence on commitments from all sources in the cases of Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and
Uruguay. Not surprisingly, a pronounced decline of maturities is reported for Brazil. However, a
similarly strong decline occurred in Chile. The latter development can be attributed to a significant
shift from public and publicly guaranteed loans from private creditors to private non-guaranteed
debt, the maturities of which are probably shorter [World Bank, b, 1992, Vol. II, p. 75).12
Argentina comes close to these two countries.
1
3 For all remaining sample countries,
the significance of short-term debt stocks is considerably lower.
1
4 In many of these
economies, net flows of short-term debt were negative in the early 1990s
(particularly in Chile and Bolivia), which further weakens the justification of concerns
about sustainabiiity.
5. Why Flawed Indicators Provide Valuable Insights
Evidently, the discussion on the sustainabiiity of capital inflows to Latin America
suffers from serious data shortcomings. Deficiencies and inconsistencies between
different sources are most pronounced where information is most urgently needed to
clarify the issue, i.e. with respect to short-term capital movements. Objections may
be raised against each individual indicator considered in the preceding paragraphs.
All the more surprisingly, however, the analysis results in a fairly consistent picture
and casts considerable doubts on the mainstream reasoning about problems of
sustaining capital inflows to Latin America.
Taken together, the indicators suggest four conclusions. First, it is implausible to
restrict the discussion to Latin America. The risk of a sudden reversal of capital
inflows, as reflected by the data, is not exceptionally large as compared to other
regions such as East Asia. Second, the regional perspective must be supplemented
by a closer evaluation of country-specific evidence. Typically, the regional
aggregates for Latin America obscure remarkable differences at the country level.
Third, such a disaggregated analysis shows consistently that the sustainabiiity of
capital inflows is at risk in Brazil and Peru in the first place. Concerns appear to be
largely unjustified in the case of Chile, while the evidence for the remaining sample
countries is less straightforward. Fourth, the ranking of Latin American economies in
terms of the sustainabiiity of capital inflows seems to be related to their domestic
economic policies. The tentative proposition of a link between reform-mindedness
and capital inflows will be evaluated in some more detail in the subsequent section.
1
3 On the role of exchange rate policies as an incentive for speculative capital inflows to Argentina,
see Section III.
1
4 Based on the change of this indicator since 1985, the sustainabiiity of capital inflows improved
quile substantially in Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela.Blbliofhek
4es Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
III. Economic Policy and the Sustainability of Capital inflows
1. The Relevance of Domestic Policies
When the debt crisis erupted in the early 1980s, adverse global shocks such as oil
price hikes, the world recession and soaring interest rates were considered to be the
major cause in many early analyses [see e.g. the influential evaluation by Cline,
1984]. The focus is again on external factors in the current debate on the nature of
recent capital inflows to Latin America. The universality of these inflows is attributed
to "falling interest rates, a continuing recession, and balance of payments
developments in the United States (that) have encouraged investors to shift their
resources to Latin America" [Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart, 1993, pp. 2f.]. The
widespread concern about the sustainability of capital inflows is basically due to the
emphasis on global developments. Another reversal of capital movements is
anticipated once external conditions change to the detriment of the present
recipients.
It is not to be denied that global events contributed to both the simultaneous onset of
the debt crisis and the recent boom of capital flows to Latin America. Surprisingly,
however, the debate on sustainability reveals the same bias towards external factors
as was the case with earlier analyses of debt problems. Subsequent and more
comprehensive assessments of the causes of the debt crisis provided ample
empirical evidence on the relevance of domestic economic policies.
1
5 Section II
tentatively suggests that the economic policy stance of Latin American governments
might also explain the differences among the sample countries in terms of the
significance and structure of capital inflows. The analysis of this section attempts to
substantiate the link between domestic policies and the sustainability of capital
inflows. Subsequently, it is shown that such an analysis helps to develop appropriate
policy conclusions.
Previous investigations into the internal determinants of capital inflows have
identified the "attractiveness portfolio" of recipient countries to consist of favourable
overall economic performance, macroeconomic stability, less pervasive government
interference into goods and factor markets, and favourable sovereign risk
1
5 Sachs [1985, p. 526] concluded: "The debt crisis of the early 1980s was triggered by a combination
of global economic events and domestic developments in the debtor countries .... The best
evidence for the role of distinctively national developments is the success of many debtor countries
in surmounting external shocks without an emergency rescheduling". See also Cuddington [1989];
Sachs [1989a]; Nunnenkamp [1986].14
perceptions.
1
6 These policy areas can reasonably be supposed to matter for the
sustainability of capital inflows as well. For some of them, it is relatively
straightforward to construct meaningful indicators. In other respects, this proves to
be fairly difficult, especially if cross-country information is required for the very recent
past. Because of data limitations, the subsequent discussion focuses on selected
indicators of economic performance and stability, and some proxies reflecting the
risk perceptions of foreign capital suppliers. The evidence on government
encroachment on private economic activities is particularly deficient.
1
7
2. Economic Performance and Stability
For various reasons, the sustainability of capital inflows is likely to depend on
fundamental performance indicators such as per-capita GDP growth and the private
investment ratio. Times and again, economic growth has been shown to be a
crucially important determinant of FDI, i.e. that type of capital inflow subject to the
lowest risk of a sudden reversal (see Section II.3).
1
S A favourable growth
performance stimulates longer-term engagements of foreign investors and creditors.
It reduces the risk that external obligations cannot be serviced because the
mobilization of due payments suffers from domestic resource constraints.
1
9 High and




The similarity in the ranking of the sample countries with respect to the sustainability
of capital inflows on the one hand, and the performance indicators on the other hand
is striking (Table 6). Chile for which concerns about sustainability were found to be
largely unjustified experienced particularly high growth rates, which further increased
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (1989-1992: 5.1 percent). Moreover, this country
1
6 For details, see Agarwal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp [1991]; Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. [1991];
Nunnenkamp [1992].
1
7 On conceptual questions and data constraints in analyzing goods and factor market distortions,
see Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. [1991].
1
8 For an overview of the literature, see Agarwal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp [1991, Chapter II].
1
9 On transfer risks, see Section 111.4 below.
2
0 On the vicious circle of a debt overhang, depressed investment and impaired debt-service
capacity, see e.g. Krugman [ 1988]; for a critical assessment, see e.g. Hofman, Reisen [1991 ].15

































































































































Source: Pfeffermann, Madarassy [1992]; ECLAC [1992].
reported the steepest increase of private investment.
2
1 Those economies for which
the above discussion suggests the highest risk of a sudden reversal of capital inflows
are to be found at the opposite extreme. Only in Brazil and Peru, per-capita income
declined for three consecutive years in the 1990s. The reduction of the private
investment ratio by about 3 percentage points in Peru, though from a high initial
level, was only surpassed by Venezuela. As in Section II, the remaining sample
countries rank in a medium position. According to the performance indicators of
Table 6, the chances for sustainable capital inflows improved in Mexico while they
deteriorated in Colombia. For Argentina and Bolivia, it remains to be seen whether
private investment will pick up as did economic growth.
Chile occupies a top position with regard to macroeconomic stability as well (Table
7). Continued stabilization efforts supported a long-term, i.e. sustainable,
engagement of investors and creditors. Economic stability renders it easier for
private agents to assess the return to financial transactions. Instability reflected in
high and volatile inflation, excessive budget deficits and heavily fluctuating real
exchange rates is likely to induce a shift towards projects with short pay-off periods
2
1 The major emphasis is placed here on changes ol the private investment ratio. Different levels of
this ratio across countries may be largely because private investment is calculated as the
difference between total gross domestic investment and consolidated public investment; for the
data problems inherent in this method, see Pfeffermann, Madarassy [1992, pp. 71.].16


















































































































































































































































Figures correspond to the variation between November (or October) 1992 and November (October) 1991. -


























; ECLAC figures which are not comparable across countries. The latter figures correspond to the
nancial public sector (excluding provinces and municipalities) in the case of Argentina; he non-financial public sector in the case of
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela; to the operational deficit of the non-financial public sector in
government n the ca e of Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Figures fo 1991 and
the case of Brazil; to the central
992 are preliminary estimates. - Real exchange rate
between the currency of each country and the currencies of its main trading partners (weighted by the relative participation of trading partners in
the exports of the country under analysis). Consumer price indices were used as deflators. -
 e January - to - September average. -
deviation of the real effective exchange rate.
' Standard
Source: ECLAC [1992]; IMF [a].17
and, eventually, results in another reversal of capital flows. Such risks were
forestalled in Chile by its long-standing reputation of containing inflation and
consolidating public sector balances. Furthermore, real exchange rate volatility was
kept at bay since 1985 (Table 7). Though less consistently, macroeconomic
instability has been low by Latin American standards in Colombia and Costa Rica as
well.
More recently, major stabilization efforts have reduced the risk of a sudden reversal
of capital movements in Bolivia and Mexico. Argentina followed suit in 1991.
However, exchange rate volatility has remained considerable in all three cases. The
exceptionally high standard deviation of the real effective exchange rate in Bolivia is
due to sharp real devaluations. By contrast, a real appreciation occurred in Argentina
and Mexico in the early 1990s. Both countries have implemented exchange-rate
based stabilization programmes. The subsequent real appreciation threatens to
undermine the international competitiveness of their exports. It also implies that the
effects of macroeconomic stabilization on the sustainability of capital inflows remain
ambiguous. Earlier experiences have shown that a nominal exchange rate anchor
encourages speculative capital inflows.
2
2 A peg is apt to raise the "hot money" share
in capital inflows, since differentials between domestic and foreign short-term interest
rates can be exploited as long as the peg is credible [Reisen, 1993a, p. 4].
Speculative inflows might easily be reversed once the sustainability of the peg is
questioned by private agents.
2
3
For some of the remaining sample countries, the sustainability of capital inflows is
threatened even more seriously. Fiscal consolidation suffers from low credibility in
Brazil where it was mainly achieved through the accumulation of arrears on the
external debt and the deferment of internal debt service [Ohana, Mussi, 1991].
Furthermore, inflation is still exceptionally high. High, though reduced, inflation rates,
persistent public sector deficits, and volatile and dramatically appreciated real
exchange rates are salient features in Peru. Macroeconomic stability has neither
been achieved in Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.
2
2 For a detailed evaluation ol exchange-rate based stabilization episodes in the Southern Cone of
Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s, see the contributions in the special issue of World
Development [1985]; for a summary, see e.g. Edwards [1989, pp. 164L] as well as Schweickert,
Nunnenkamp, Hiemenz [1992, pp. 14ff.].
2
3 Schweickert [1993] analyzes in detail the relation between the exchange rate regime and capital
movements.18
3. Structural Adjustment and Consistency of Reforms
The above discussion on exchange rate policies has indicated that the sustainability
of capital inflows also depends on the consistency of adjustment programmes. More
generally, it can be argued that isolated attempts at macroeconomic stabilization are
a necessary but insufficient condition to ensure continued capital inflows.
2
4
Especially in Latin America, stabilization has to be supplemented by structural
reforms to be credible and sustainable [see also Nunnenkamp, Schmieding, 1991].
In order to improve the attractiveness for long-term capital inflows, distortions in
factor and goods markets must be removed [Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al., 1991].
Recent information on relevant indicators reflecting the degree of such distortions is
seriously deficient.
2
5 Therefore, the subsequent paragraphs are restricted to
indicators on the degree of openness to import competition and on export
performance. Although this restriction is enforced by data limitations, the information
presented in Table 8 is highly relevant as concerns the impact of policy induced
distortions on the sustainability of capital imports. Besides fiscal policy, trade policy
interventions turned out to be at the root of Latin America's impaired attractiveness
for foreign capital in the 1980s [see e.g. Sachs, 1989a, and the underlying country
studies]. The elimination of an anti-export bias would help to sustain capital inflows in
countries which had previously promoted import substitution. A less protectionist and
more balanced trade regime prevents the misallocation of investment and may,
thereby, enhance the long-term financing of projects which are in conformity with the
country's comparative advantage. Openness towards world markets will probably
raise the share of FDI in total capital inflows. Export-oriented FDI will be encouraged
in the first place. Furthermore, import barriers have recently been shown to be ill-
suited to stimulate FDI as a means to jump over protectionist fences [Agarwal,
Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991]. It rather turned out that exports from the home country
of foreign investors to potential host countries were a predecessor of FDI.
2
4 On the relevance of policy coherence for inducing (foreign and domestic) investment, see
Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. [1991, pp. 80ff.].
2
5 For a tentative comparison of financial market conditions between four major debtor countries in
Latin America, see Nunnenkamp [1992]. Measured by real interest rates and financial deepening, it
turned out that the functioning of linancial markets was seriously impaired in Argentina and Brazil.
Chile represented the antipole. Economic reforms in Mexico appeared to have helped overcoming
financial repression. More comprehensive information on factor and goods markets distortions is
available for specific countries. For example, it has been shown that Brazil's attractiveness for
foreign capital suffered from interventionist goods markets policies (e.g. the tradition of price
controls), labour market deficiencies, and policy induced shortcomings of linancial intermediation
[Nunnenkamp, Funke, Schweickert, 1992].19
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Indicators on the trade policy stance of Latin American governments would optimally
relate to effective protection rates which are, however, not available on a current
cross-country basis. As an imperfect substitute, the development of import/GDP
ratios and world market shares is portrayed in Table Q.
25 Notwithstanding conceptual
limitations, the typical ranking of sample countries is revealed once again. Both
indicators point to a further opening up towards world markets in the case of Chile.
At the opposite extreme, an increasing isolation from world markets is observed for
Brazil and Peru. The evidence is more ambiguous for most of the remaining sample
countries. Rising import/GDP ratios suggest less protectionist trade policies in
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Venezuela. In some of these cases, declining world
market shares have to be attributed to depressed oil prices. The oil factor is also
important for Mexico. However, a more favourable world market performance was
probably hindered by the real appreciation of the Mexican Peso in the early 1990s
(Table 7) [see also Corbo, 1992]. Argentina is currently facing the same risk. This
underlines the earlier argument that exchange-rate based stabilization programmes
may undermine the international competitiveness of exports and, as a corollary, the
sustainability of capital inflows.
2
6 Import/GDP ratios are subject to a large country bias. Therefore, the interpretation is restricted to
the changes of this indicator over time. World market shares are influenced by different price
developments for world exports on the one hand, and the sample countries' exports on the other
hand. The ensuing distortions are particularly large for oil-exporting countries.20
4. Sovereign Risk Perceptions
The foreign debt situation has improved in nearly all sample countries when recent
debt-service ratios are compared to the situation in the mid-1980s (Table 9). In
countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Peru, however, lower debt-service ratios are
largely due to the accumulation of interest arrears. It is rather unlikely that capital
inflows are sustainable unless the uncertainties arising from arrears are overcome.
Moreover, the persistance of arrears in some countries suggests that declining debt-
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1992: November.
Source: World Bank [b, 1992]; World Bank [a]; Institutional Investor [var. iss.]
Sovereign risk adversely affects the sustainability of capital inflows as foreign
investors and creditors cannot be confident to be fully repaid in the future. The
theory of sovereign risk relates to the unwillingness of capital recipients to service21
their external obligations.
2
7 Debt inflows are subject to the risk of wilful default, while
FDI may be expropriated. Practically, the available indicators on the risk perceptions
of foreign capital suppliers cannot isolate the risk of wilful transfer restrictions from
the risk that capital recipients are unable to service external obligations. The country
credit ratings and the secondary market notations reported in Table 9 indicate the
degree to which any foreign engagement, apart from speculative transactions, is
discouraged because of unfavourable risk perceptions prevailing in international
capital markets.
2
8 In other words, the indicators provide a summary assessment of
the afore-mentioned elements of the sample countries' "attractiveness portfolio" and,
thereby, of the consistency of their reform efforts.
Not surprisingly, the ranking of the sample countries with regard to the two indicators
on risk perceptions reveals strong similarities:
- Chile outperformed all other sample countries. Secondary market notations
approached the face value of Chilean debt recently. The country's credit rating
improved most impressively since 1985 so that Chile ranked among the top third
of the 126 (developed and developing) countries evaluated by the Institutional
Investor in September 1992.
- Costa Rica represents another case of dramatically increasing secondary market
notations, and a steady and significant improvement of the credit rating. Apart
from Chile, a similarly strong increase of the latter indicator is only observed for
Bolivia, where it started from an extremely low level, however.
- Typically, risk perceptions deteriorated severely over much of the 1980s, but
indicator values recovered thereafter. This applies to Argentina, Mexico and
Venezuela in particular. In the former two cases, the recovery appears to be
closely related to the comprehensive reform programmes implemented in 1991
and the late 1980s respectively.
- Throughout the period under consideration, the indicators point to a relatively
favourable risk perception in the cases of Colombia and Uruguay. Bolivia and
Peru rank at the other extreme. Secondary market notations improved somewhat
recently, but remained extremely low. The development of the credit rating reveals
2
7 For an overview, see Eaton, Gersovilz, Stiglitz [1986].
2
8 Most evidently, new lending is discouraged if the existing creditors do not expect to be fully repaid.
The market valuation of additional transfers would become identical to the value of existing claims
[Dooley, 1986]. FDI inflows may be subject to similar disincentive problems. The profitability of new
foreign investment will be impaired if investors expect a debt overhang to result in high taxes levied
on investment-induced incremental income [Sachs, 1989b; Agarwal, Gubitz, Nunnenkamp, 1991,
pp. 78ff.].22
a noteworthy difference between these two countries, however. The improvement
of this indicator for Bolivia and its deterioration for Peru had as a consequence
that the former country is no longer among the bottom quarter of all countries
considered by the Institutional Investor, while Peru joined this subgroup recently.
- Unfavourable risk perceptions in the case of Brazil support earlier concerns about
the sustainability of capital inflows to this country. The evidence is striking in sev-
eral respects. Among the major Latin American debtor countries, Brazil is the only
one for which the credit rating in 1992 was still lower than in 1985. Secondary
market notations recovered only marginally from the bottom value of 22 per cent
in 1989. The 1992 notation was less than 40 per cent of the 1986 notation, which
is outstandingly low as compared to other problem borrowers such as Argentina
and Venezuela.
To summarize, the evaluation of risk perceptions largely confirms the evidence on
specific policy indicators and performance criteria reported in previous sections. The
sustainability of capital inflows is at serious risk in some Latin American countries,
particularly in Brazil and Peru. Such risks are substantially lower for the rest of the
sample. Especially for Chile, concerns about the sustainability of capital inflows are
largely unjustified.
IV. Policy Options to Deal with Unsustainable Capital Inflows
The preceding analysis offers several insights which contradict some (explicit or im-
plicit) assumptions underlying the current debate on capital inflows to Latin America.
First, it is rather good news that the region has regained access to international capi-
tal markets after a long period of serious shortage of foreign capital, notwithstanding
the policy challenges the recent trend reversal might involve. Second, the inflows are
not excessive when contrasted with the evidence on capital inflows to other regions
such as East Asia.
Third, any generalized "hot money" interpretation of capital inflows to Latin America
is grossly misleading. Their significance and structure differ remarkably among the
economies of the region. Typically, the extremes are represented by Chile on the
one hand, and Brazil and Peru on the other hand. The evidence suggests that unre-
ported "hot money" transactions are relatively small in the Chilean case, but signifi-
cantly larger for the latter countries. The traditionally favoured location of FDI in Latin
America, i.e. Brazil, suffered from a serious loss in attractiveness, especially vis-a-vis
Mexico. All in all, the risk of a sudden reversal of inflows is heavily concentrated on a
limited number of sample countries, among which Brazil and Peru figure prominently.23
Fourth, it cannot be denied that external factors play an important role in explaining
the recent boom of capital inflows. However, the country-specific differences in terms
of sustainability are clearly related to domestic economic performance and the policy
stance of Latin American governments. Long-term capital inflows are concentrated
on countries such as Chile and Mexico which have established a strong reputation of
reform-mindedness. While these countries have stabilized their economies and
opened up towards world markets, persistent macroeconomic instability and further
isolation from international competition endanger the sustainability of inflows in Brazil
and Peru. Risk perceptions developed unfavourably where governments continued
to adhere to a muddling-through approach, the most prominent example of which is
Brazil. By contrast, comprehensive reform efforts helped to restore creditworthiness,
e.g. in Argentina and Mexico. However, remaining policy inconsistencies must be
tackled in the latter countries. A sudden reversal of capital inflows cannot be ruled
out as long as speculative transfers are encouraged by using the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor.
These results have important policy implications. This refers to the ongoing discus-
sion on how to interfere with present capital inflows in the first place [see e.g. Calvo,
Leiderman, Reinhart 1992; 1993; Reisen, 1993a], The economic rationale of any in-
tervention is questionable if capital inflows can reasonably be considered sustain-
able. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the various options to deal with unsustainable
inflows is open to question once politico-economic constraints are taken into
account. And, finally, the above analysis suggests that broadly defined economic
policy reforms are superior to targeted intervention for enhancing the sustainability of
capital inflows.
The economic rationale for policy intervention rests on the alleged adverse impact of
capital inflows on (i) the international competitiveness of exports, and (ii) domestic fi-
nancial stability once inflows are reversed (see also Section I). Such concerns are
largely unjustified, however, if the prospects of sustaining the inflows are fairly good.
Under such favourable conditions, which prevail particularly in Chile, increased ex-
change rate fluctuations triggered by volatile capital flows, and the ensuing uncer-
tainties for exporters are unlikely to materialize. The real appreciation which perma-
nent capital inflows might induce may lead to a new exchange rate equilibrium so
that policy intervention would be counterproductive. Furthermore, capital inflows do
not automatically result in a considerable real appreciation. Its degree is reduced to
the extent that capital inflows are spent on traded goods, e.g. higher imports. It is
consistent with this reasoning that the real exchange rate appreciated (vis-a-vis
1985) in Brazil and Peru whose imports declined relative to GDP, while all sample24
countries with rising import to GDP ratios prevented the real exchange rate from
appreciating.
The effectiveness of various interventionist policy options to deal with unsustainable
inflows is flawed on purely economic grounds [Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart, 1992, pp.
"34ff.]:
- Experience suggests that taxes on capital inflows can be easily evaded, e.g.
through misinvoicing of trade transactions.
- Non-sterilized intervention by the central bank, i.e. the absorption of imported for-
eign capital in exchange for domestic money, adds to inflationary pressures.
Thereby, it creates the real exchange rate appreciation it was supposed to
combat.
- In the case of sterilized intervention, the central bank absorbs the imported foreign
capital in exchange for government bonds.
2
9 While additional inflationary pressure
is avoided, sterilization tends to maintain relatively high domestic interest rates.
Persistently high international interest-rate differentials do not only have adverse
fiscal effects, but also perpetuate the capital inflows which led to the intervention
in the first place.
3
0
- Trade policy measures such as export subsidies, through which the export sector
might be insulated from the real exchange rate appreciation, could considerably
distort the allocation of resources and undermine fiscal consolidation.
Political economy arguments raise further doubts as concerns the effectiveness of
policy intervention, particularly in a Latin American context. For example, it may be
announced that trade policy measures will be phased out in order to contain misallo-
cation and fiscal costs. However, past experience in Latin America renders it rather
unlikely that such announcements would be credible and induce the desired private
sector response. More generally, from a political economy point of view, scepticism
is justified as to the governments' ability and willingness to react appropriately and as
timely as would be required by sudden changes in capital flows. There is little reason
to assume that governments know better than private agents operating in financial
markets, whether capital inflows will prove to be a speculative bubble or turn out to
2
9 This type of intervention has been the most popular policy response recently. Chile and Colombia
are examples in Latin America.
3
0 It does not help very much that the fiscal costs of sterilized intervention are negligible in present
value terms if capital inflows and the ensuing exchange rate appreciation are correctly assessed as
temporary [Reisen, 1993a, p. 7]. In a Latin American context, the credibility of governments is at
stake. Consequently, the immediate fiscal impact is likely to dominate private sector behaviour.25
be sustainable. Even if the need for intervention is correctly assessed, any delay in
the decision process may eventually result in pro-cyclical policy effects, rather than
smoothing booms and busts in short-term capital movements.
Finally, intervention may adversely affect the sustainability of capital inflows even
under the most favourable circumstances, i.e. when problems of implementation can
be avoided. The negative side effects of policy interference threaten to undermine
the credibility of economic reform programmes. This is most evident if the
macroeconomic environment is destabilized. Macroeconomic stabilization has been
shown to be crucially important to enhance the sustainability of capital inflows. Ad-
hoc interventions resulting in higher inflation and larger fiscal deficits would, thus,
compromise favourable longer-term effects of successful stabilization, even if short-
term speculation were contained. A similar conflict exists with respect to trade-re-
lated interventions which would delay the opening up of Latin American economies
towards world markets.
Interventionist policies threaten to erode the very basis on which their effectiveness
relies, i.e. the government's credibility. This conflict might be easier to avoid by gov-
ernments which have established a strong reputation of macroeconomic stability and
world market orientation.
3
1 While this may apply to industrialized countries and Asian
NIEs, the conditions are dramatically different in most Latin American countries. For
this region, the critical question of whether recent capital inflows can be sustained
depends primarily on the consistency of economic reform programmes and the gov-
ernments' revealed determination to stay on course.
Traditional policy conclusions on how to ensure continued access to international
capital markets remain highly relevant under the present conditions of booming in-
flows to Latin America. Pervasive evidence supports the proposition that reform-
mindedness and strong internal adjustment efforts help sustaining urgently needed
foreign capital inflows. Latin American countries such as Brazil and Peru, facing
considerable risks of a sudden reversal of speculative inflows should no longer post-
pone a comprehensive overhaul of misguided domestic policies. The increasing
number of success stories in the region provides most relevant lessons in this
respect. In dealing with unsustainable capital inflows, the intensification of reform
efforts is clearly superior to discretionary policy interference.
3
1 On successful sterilized inlorvenlion in Asian countries, see Reisen (1993b].26
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a Excluding technical cooperation grants. - b Excluding IMF loans. -
c Includes public and publicly guaranteed
debt from private creditors plus total non-guaranteed private debt. -
 d Projected.





















































































































































































































a Excluding technical cooperation grants. •
 D Excluding IMF loans. -
 c Includes public and publicly guaranteed
debt from private creditors plus total non-guaranteed private debt.
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Source: World Bank [b, 1992).